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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-"- • 02 The Court of Appeals now has

"•'

jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(j).
V
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Mr. Henshaw asserts the following issues on appeal:
A. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in denying Mr. Henshaw's
Motion to Vacate that portion of the trial court's May 15, 2006 directed verdict
holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights the Kings admit they
sold to the Watrouses, that Mrs. Watrous thereafter sold to Barbara Henshaw and
Barbara Henshaw sold to Dee Henshaw, did not pass to Dee Henshaw, because the
Kings lacked standing to even assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water
rights, that the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred
Watrous upon Raymond Watrous's death and ultimately to Mr. Henshaw? (Record
at 1393).
Standard of Review: When a motion to vacate is based on a claim of lack of
jurisdiction, it is reviewed under the correctness standard. 95 P.3d 1211; State of
Utah v. All Real Property: 2004 UT App 232.
B. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion To Vacate
Under Rule 60(b)(4) URCP as "untimely?" (Record at 1360-1361).
Standard of Review: A denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
STATUTES:
I JC V §75-1-201:
General definitions.
Si lb ject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters that are
ap j: \i : i .ble to specific chapters, parts, or sections, andun less the context otherwise
i • i :][i :i ii • 3S, in this code:
(1) "Agent' 1 includes an attoi ne> -in-fact undei a durable oi nondurable po v\ ei c f
attorney, an individual authorized to make decisions concerning another's health
cai e and an,,, indrs ddual authorized to make decisions for another under a natural
• :ic:: ath act.
(2) "Application" means a written, request to the registrar for an order of informal
probate or appointment under Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 3, Informal Probate and
Appointment Proceedings.
(3) "Beneficiary," as it relates to trust beneficiaries, includes a person who has
an^ present or future interest, vested or contingent, and also includes the owner of
an interest by assignment or other transfer; as it relates to a charitable trust, includes
any person entitled to enforce the trust; as it relates to a "beneficiary of a beneficiary
designation," refers to a beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy, of an account
ith P O D designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of a
j: • :! iniisi : n, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate
t! ai lsfei at death; and, as it relates to a "beneficiary designated in a governing
insti i in i ' " nu-iudes a grantee of a deed, a devisee, a trust beneficiary, a,
1: • ;: ii 2fi ::
or' a beneficiary designation, a donee, appointee, or taker m default of a
pow er ot" appointment, and a, person in whose favor a power of attorney or a power
held in any individual, fiduciary, or representative capacity is exercised.
(4) "Beneficiary designation,..1' refers to :i ^ovenurM instalment naming a
- \ ii

beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy, of an account with POD designation,
of a security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of a pension, profit-sharing,
retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate transfer at death.
(5) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under this code by
intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any
person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote
descendant.
(6) "Claims," in respect to estates of decedents and protected persons, includes
liabilities of the decedent or protected person, whether arising in contract, in tort, or
otherwise, and liabilities of the estate which arise at or after the death of the
decedent or after the appointment of a conservator, including funeral expenses and
expenses of administration. "Claims" does not include estate or inheritance taxes, or
demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific
assets alleged to be included in the estate.
(7) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by a court to manage the
estate of a protected person.
(8) "Court" means any of the courts of record in this state having jurisdiction in
matters relating to the affairs of decedents.
(9) "Descendant" of an individual means all of his descendants of all generations,
with the relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the
definition of child and parent contained in this title.
(10) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or
personal property and, when used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal
property by will.
(11) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to receive a devise. For the
purposes of Title 75, Chapter 3, Probate of Wills and Administration, in the case of
a devise to an existing trust or trustee, or to a trustee in trust described by will, the
trust or trustee is the devisee,and the beneficiaries are not devisees.
(12) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as described by Section
75-5-401.
(13) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of a decedent
from his personal representative other than as a creditor or purchaser. A
testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the extent of distributed assets or
increment thereto remaining in his hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to
whom the trustee has distributed property received from a personal representative is
a distributee of the personal representative. For purposes of this provision,
"testamentary trustee" includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred by will, to
the extent of the devised assets.
(14) "Estate" includes the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose
-vin-

affairs are subject to this title as originally constituted and as it exists from time to
time during administration.
(15) "Exempt property" means that property of a decedent's estate which is
described in Section 75-2-403.
(16) "Fiduciary" includes a personal representative, guardian, conservator, and
trustee.
(17) "Foreign personal representative" means a personal representative of
another jurisdiction.
(18) "Formal proceedings" means proceedings conducted before a judge with
notice to interested persons.
(19) "Governing instrument" means a deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity
policy, account with POD designation, security registered in beneficiary form
(TOD), pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument
creating or exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a
dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type.
(20) "Guardian" means a person who has qualified as a guardian of a minor or
incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary or court appointment, or by written
instrument as provided in Section 75-5-202.5, but excludes one who is merely a
guardian ad litem.
(21) "Heirs," except as controlled by Section 75-2-711, means persons, including
the surviving spouse and state, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate
succession to the property of a decedent.
(22) "Incapacitated person" means any person who is impaired by reason of
mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs,
chronic intoxication, or other cause, except minority, to the extent of lacking
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions.
(23) "Informal proceedings" mean those conducted without notice to interested
persons by an officer of the court acting as a registrar for probate of a will or
appointment of a personal representative.
(24) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate
or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person. It also includes persons
having priority for appointment as personal representative, other fiduciaries
representing interested persons, a settlor of a trust, if living, or the settlor's legal
representative, if any, if the settlor is living but incapacitated. The meaning as it
relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined
according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.
(25) "Issue" of a person means descendant as defined in Subsection (9).
(26) "Joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and "community property with
-1Y-

the right of survivorship" includes coowners of property held under circumstances
that entitle one or more to the whole of the property on the death of the other or
others, but excludes forms of coownership registration in which the underlying
ownership of each party is in proportion to that party's contribution.
(27) "Lease" includes an oil, gas, or other mineral lease.
(28) "Letters" includes letters testamentary, letters of guardianship, letters of
administration, and letters of conservatorship.
(29) "Minor" means a person who is under 18 years of age.
(30) "Mortgage" means any conveyance, agreement, or arrangement in which
property is used as security.
(31) "Nonresident decedent" means a decedent who was domiciled in another
jurisdiction at the time of his death.
(32) "Organization" includes a corporation, limited liability company, business
trust, estate, trust, partnership, joint venture, association, government of
governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(33) "Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or who would be entitled to
take if the child died without a will, as a parent under this code by intestate
succession from the child whose relationship is in question and excludes any person
who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent.
(34) "Payor" means a trustee, insurer, business entity, employer, government,
governmental agency or subdivision, or any other person authorized or obligated by
law or a governing instrument to make payments.
(35) "Person" means an individual or an organization.
(36) (a) "Personal representative" includes executor, administrator, successor
personal representative, special administrator, and persons who perform
substantially the same function under the law governing their status.
(b) "General personal representative" excludes special administrator.
(37) "Petition" means a written request to the court for an order after notice.
(38) "Proceeding" includes action at law and suit in equity.
(39) "Property" includes both real and personal property or any interest therein
and means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(40) "Protected person" means a person for whom a conservator has been
appointed. A "minor protected person" means a minor for whom a conservator has
been appointed because of minority.
(41) "Protective proceeding" means a proceeding described in Section 75-5-401.
(42) "Registrar" refers to the official of the court designated to perform the
functions of registrar as provided in Section 75-1-307.
(43) "Security" includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest, or participation in an oil, gas, or
-x-

mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease,
collateral trust certificate, transferable share, voting trust certificate, and, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, or any certificate of
interest or participation, any temporary or interim certificate, receipt, or certificate
of deposit for, or any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
(44) "Settlement," in reference to a decedent's estate, includes the full process of
administration, distribution, and closing.
(45) "Special administrator" means a personal representative as described in
Sections 75-3-614 through 75-3-618.
(46) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or insular possession subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, or a Native American tribe or band recognized by
federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
(47) "Successor personal representative" means a personal representative, other
than a special administrator, who is appointed to succeed a previously appointed
personal representative.
(48) "Successors" means persons, other than creditors, who are entitled to
property of a decedent under the decedent's will or this title.
(49) "Supervised administration" refers to the proceedings described in Title 75,
Chapter 3, Part 5, Supervised Administration.
(50) "Survive," except for purposes of Part 3 of Article VI, Uniform TOD
Security Registration Act, means that an individual has neither predeceased an
event, including the death of another individual, nor is considered to have
predeceased an event under Section 75-2-104 or 75-2-702. The term includes its
derivatives, such as "survives," "survived," "survivor," and "surviving."
(51) "Testacy proceeding" means a proceeding to establish a will or determine
intestacy.
(52) "Testator" includes an individual of either sex.
(53) "Tmst" includes a health savings account, as defined in Section 223,
Internal Revenue Code, any express tmst, private or charitable, with additions
thereto, wherever and however created. The term also includes a trust created or
determined by judgment or decree under which the tmst is to be administered in the
manner of an express tmst. The term excludes other constructive tmsts, and it
excludes resulting tmsts, conservatorships, personal representatives, tmst accounts
as defined in Title 75, Chapter 6, Nonprobate Transfers, custodial arrangements
pursuant to any Uniform Transfers To Minors Act, business tmsts providing for
certificates to be issued to beneficiaries, common tmst funds, voting tmsts, preneed
funeral plans under Title 58, Chapter 9, Funeral Services Licensing Act, security
-XI-

arrangements, liquidation trusts, and trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts,
dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any
kind, and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for
another.
(54) "Trustee" includes an original, additional, and successor trustee, and
cotrustee, whether or not appointed or confirmed by the court.
(55) "Ward" means a person for whom a guardian has been appointed. A "minor
ward" is a minor for whom a guardian has been appointed solely because of
minority.
(56) "Will" includes codicil and any testamentary instrument which merely
appoints an executor, revokes or revises another will, nominates a guardian, or
expressly excludes or limits the right of an individual or class to succeed to property
of the decedent passing by intestate succession.
UCA §78-2-2(3)(j):
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders,
judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final
judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(hi) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing
actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) afinaljudgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the
-Xll-

United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders Judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on
legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters
over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a Court of
record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for
writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme
Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter
4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j):
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to
issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Y111-

Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or
other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital
felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree
or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parenttime, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G,
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.

RULES:
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP:
Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall,
within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a
-XIV-

proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed
order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall
file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of
the time to object.
Rule 59 URCP:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all
or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury,
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order
of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having
a fair trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of
the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it
is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days
after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under
-xv-

Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a
motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion.
The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing
affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served
may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court
for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit
reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of
its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have
granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds
therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment
shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Rule 60(b)(4) URCP:
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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VII
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the trial court's July 18, 2008 Memorandum Decision
and Order denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate that portion of the trial court's
May 15, 2006 directed verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water
rights, that the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, that Mrs. Watrous thereafter
sold to Barbara Henshaw, subsequent to Mr. Watrous' death, that Barbara Henshaw
then sold to Dee Henshaw, did not pass to Dee Henshaw.
B
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL
COURT
On or about July 1992, Barbara Henshaw purchased certain real property,
located in Wayne County, UtahfromMildred Watrous. In conjunction with the
purchase of the property, Barbara Henshaw also purchased water rights to irrigate
the property, which rights had previously been purchased by Mildred and Raymond
WatrousfromJack and Bonnie King (hereinafter "the Kings"). The water deed
given to the Watrouses by the Kings specified that the Kings were selling two hours
of the full flow of Pine Creek every eighteen days. The language of the Water Deed
was incorporated into the Warranty Deed given Mrs. Henshaw by Mildred Watrous
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at the closing of the purchase of the property.
Dee Henshaw completed the purchase of the property from his mother
Barbara Henshaw and recorded a deed to the property on August 14, 2003.
However, prior to that time he had an unrecorded deed from Mrs. Henshaw
conveying the referenced property.
From the time the Watrouses purchased the water rights, until approximately
June 1, 2000, both the Watrouses and the Henshaws used the water as needed on a
daily basis without any objection or complaint from the Kings about how much
water was being used or how the water was being used. From the time the
Henshaws purchased the property in 1992, through June 2000, the Kings never shut
off the Henshaws' water.
Beginning on or about June 1, 2000, the Kings began interfering with the
Henshaws' use of their water on a daily basis by shutting off the Henshaws' water.
Additionally the Kings made calls to the Henshaws threatening to shut off the
Henshaws' water, dig up their waterline and otherwise prevent the Henshaws' from
using the water to irrigate their property.
Sometime shortly after June 28, 2000, without first telling the Henshaws, the
Kings placed a Vi inch pipe and V2 inch gate valve on the 3-inch waterline. The 3inch waterline was installed and paid for by the Watrouses, and it was sold to the
Henshaws by Mildred Watrous. King installed the Vi inch pipe and the Vi inch gate
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valve for the express purpose of preventing the Henshaws from being able to use the
water to operate their hand lines and sprinklers to water their property. From the
time the Kings installed the lA inch pipe and gate valve on the 3-inch waterline,
installed and paid for by the Watrouses and sold to the Henshaws, the Henshaws
were denied access to the water they purchased from Mildred Watrous, who, along
with her Husband Raymond, purchased the water rights from Jack and Bonnie King.
On July 14, 2000, Barbara Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw
(hereinafter, "the Henshaws") filed suit against Jack King for: Breach of Contract,
Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or
Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. King
filed an answer claiming that he never sold the Watrouses any water rights and a
counterclaim to quiet title to the water that the Henshaws claim he sold to the
Watrouses that the Watrouses then sold to them. In his answer, King also claimed
that Mildred could only sell one half of the water that the Kings sold to her and her
Husband because the Water Deed given to the Watrouses by the Kings did not
specify that the water was sold to the Watrouses as joint tenants rather than as
tenants in common.
The Henshaws filed an amended complaint adding Bonnie King as a
defendant on August 23, 2003. The Kings filed an answer to the Henshaws'
Amended Complaint on September 10, 2003, and on June 7, 2004, the Kings filed
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an amended answer and counterclaim asserting the same defenses as Jack King did
in his answer to the plaintiffs' initial Complaint and added a claim for "quiet title."
Both parties subsequently filed various motions and the case went to trial
before Judge Lee on April 17, 2006. After the close of the plaintiffs' case, on April
19, 2005, the Kings moved for a motion for a directed verdict seeking a dismissal of
Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the case.
Judge Lee dismissed Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the
case and he dismissed Mr. Henshaw's claims for intentional interference with
economic relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conversion or
theft. Judge Lee also granted the Kings' claim that at most Mr. Henshaw could only
acquire one-half interest in the water sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings, because
the Water Deed given the Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that it was a
conveyance as joint tenants rather than tenants in common and there was no
evidence that Mrs. Watrous acquired Mr. Watrous interest in the water upon his
death.
Judge Lee then permitted the trial to go forward with Mr. Henshaw as the
sole plaintiff and assert his claims that he had an easement to connect the 3-inch
waterline to the Kings' 6-inch waterline and to use the 6-inch waterline to water his
property, and that the Kings did in fact sell water rights to the Watrouses which
rights were sold to Mrs. Henshaw and then to Mr. Henshaw. At conclusion of the
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trial, the jury found that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled to use the water the Kings
had sold to the Watrouses and conveyed to him by the Warranty Deeds from
Mildred Watrous to Mrs. Henshaw andfromMrs. Henshaw to him because he
failed to file the required forms with the State of Utah in order to permit him to use
the water. However, the jury found that the Kings had in fact sold water rights to
the Watrouses and that those water rights were transferred to Mr. Henshaw by the
Warranty DeedsfromMildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw andfromBarbara
Henshaw to him. Therefore, the jury ruled that the Kings were not entitled to have
the waterrightsquieted in themselves.
The Kings prepared an Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and sent a
copy of the proposed order to Mr. Henshaw's counsel on or about May 4, 2006.
Mr. Henshaw's counsel objected to the proposed order on motions for directed
verdict on May 15, 2006. However, that objection was not entered until May 18,
2006. However, the Kings admit that the Objection was served on them on May 15,
2006. The Kings' counsel responded to Mr. Henshaw's objection to the proposed
order on motions for directed verdict on or about May 22, 2006.
The Court issued a memorandum decision on Mr. Henshaw's objection to the
proposed order on motions for directed verdict on June 19, 2006. In the Court's
Memorandum Decision, the Court stated that it had signed and entered the proposed
order on motions for directed verdict on May 15, 2006. This was the first time
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either Mr. Henshaw or his counsel learned that the Court had signed and entered the
proposed order on motions for directed verdict. Neither the Kings nor their counsel
ever sent Mr. Henshaw or his counsel a "Notice of Judgment" on the proposed
order on motions for directed verdict as required by Rule 58A(d) URCP.
Upon learning that the Court had signed and entered the proposed order on
motions for directed verdict on May 15, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to Alter
or Amend under Rule 59 URCP, claiming that the Court had improperly signed and
entered the proposed order on motions for directed verdict because the time for him
to file an objection to the proposed order on motions for directed verdict had not yet
expired. This Motion was filed on July 27, 2006.
On September 13, 2006, the Court denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Alter or
Amend based on its conclusions that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not
binding on district courts, and that under the provisions of Rules 59, it could not
extend the time to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment or order.
On September 28, 2006, Mr. Henshaw then filed a Motion For Relief Under
Rule 60(b), asking the Court to set aside the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict,
claiming that the Kings deliberately failed to notify him that the Order on Motions
for Directed Verdict had been entered and responded to his Objection to the
proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict in order to prevent him from
learning that the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict had been entered in time to
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file an appealfromthe Order on Motions for Directed Verdict.
On November 15, 2006, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision denying
Mr. Henshaw's Motion for Relief Under Rule 60 (b) holding that Mr. Henshaw was
not sufficiently diligent in determining if the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict
had in fact been signed and entered and that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP
are not binding on district courts.
Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2006, and that
appeal was assigned case No. 20061175-CA. On November 23, 2007, the Court of
Appeals entered a memorandum decision stating that it did not have jurisdiction to
consider Mr. Henshaw's argument that the trial court erred in ruling that Raymond
Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass
to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw.
However, the Court of Appeals did not address or rule on Mr. Henshaw's assertion
that the Kings did not have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death or that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to rule upon the Kings' assertion that Raymonds'
interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death,
because the Kings lacked standing to even assert that Raymonds' interest in the
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death.
After the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur in case No. 20061175-CA,
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Mr. Henshaw file a Motion to Vacate that portion of the trial court's directed
verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights did not pass to
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw.
On July 18, 2008, the trial court issued a memorandum decision and order
denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate, stating that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to
Vacate was not timely. However, the trial court, for the third time, refused to
address Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the Kings do not have standing to assert that
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous
upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. The trial court also
refused to address Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the trial court does not have
jurisdiction to even consider the Kings assertion that Raymonds' interest in the
water rights did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to
Mr. Henshaw, because the Kings do not have standing to even assert that
Raymonds' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw.
Mr. Henshaw then filed his Notice of Appeal from the trial court's denial of
his Motion to Vacate on August 15, 2008. On September 23, 2008, the Utah
Supreme Court assigned this case to this Court.
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c
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about My 1992, Barbara Henshaw purchased certain real property,
located in Wayne County, Utah from Mildred Watrous. (Record 1-16, 467-481,
738-755,789-821).
2. In conjunction with said purchase of real property, Barbara Henshaw also
purchased water rights to irrigate the referenced property, which rights had
previously been purchased by Mildred and Raymond WatrousfromJack and
Bonnie King. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
3. The water deed given to the Watrouses by the Kings specified that the
Kings were selling two hours of the full flow of Pine Creek every eighteen days.
(Record 1-16,467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
4. The language of the Water Deed was incorporated into the Warranty
Deed given Barbara Henshaw by Mildred Watrous at the closing of the purchase of
the property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
5. Dee Henshaw completed the purchase of the propertyfromhis mother
Barbara Henshaw and recorded a deed to the property on August 14, 2003.
However, prior to that time he had an unrecorded deed from Barbara Henshaw
conveying the referenced property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
6. From the time the Watrouses purchased the water rights, until
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approximately June 1, 2000, both the Watrouses and the Henshaws used the water
as needed on a daily basis without any objection or complaint from the Kings about
how much water was being used or how the water was being used. (Record 1-16,
467-481,738-755,789-821).
7. From the time the Henshaws purchased the property in 1992, through
June 2000, the Kings never shut off the Henshaws' water. (Record 1-16, 467-481,
738-755,789-821).
8. Beginning on or about June 1, 2000, the Kings began interfering with the
Henshaws' use of their water on a daily basis by shutting off the Henshaws' water.
(Record 1-16,467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
9. Additionally the Kings made calls to the Henshaws threatening to shut off
the Henshaws' water, dig up their waterline and otherwise prevent the Henshaws
from using the water to irrigate their property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755,
789-821).
10. Sometime shortly after June 28, 2000, without first telling the Henshaws,
the Kings placed a XA inch pipe and XA inch gate valve on the 3-inch waterline. The
3-inch waterline was installed and paid for by the Watrouses, and it was sold to the
Henshaws by Mildred Watrous. King installed the lA inch pipe and the V2 inch gate
valve for the express purpose of preventing the Henshaws from being able to use the
water to operate their hand lines and sprinklers to water their property. (Record 1-10-

16,467-481,738-755,789-821).
11. From the time the Kings installed the lA inch pipe and gate valve on the
3-inch waterline, installed and paid for by the Watrouses and sold to the Henshaws,
the Henshaws were denied access to the water they purchasedfromMildred
Watrous, who, along with her Husband Raymond, purchased the water rights from
Jack and Bonnie King. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
12. On July 14,2000, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw
filed suit against Jack King for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach
of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. (Record at 1-16).
13. King filed an answer claiming that he never sold the Watrouses any
water rights and counterclaim to quiet title to the water that the Henshaws claim he
sold to the Watrouses that the Watrouses then sold to them. (Record at 24-31).
14. In his answer, King also claimed that Mildred could only sell one half of
the water that the Kings sold to her and her Husband because the Water Deed given
to the Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that the water was sold to the
Watrouses as joint tenants rather than as tenants in common. (Record at 24-31).
15. The Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Bonnie King as a
defendant on August 22, 2003. (Record at 467-481).
16. The Kings filed an answer to the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on

September 10, 2003. (Record at 486-494).
17. On June 7, 2004, the Kings filed an amended answer and counterclaim
asserting the same defenses as Jack King did in his answer to the plaintiffs' initial
Complaint and added a claim for "quiet title." (Record at 646-655).
18. Both parties subsequently filed various motions and the case went to
trial before Judge Lee on April 17, 2006. (Record at 656-1010).
19. After the close of the plaintiffs' case, on April 19, 2005, the Kings
moved for a motion for a directed verdict seeking a dismissal of Barbara Henshaw
and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the case. (Record at 1068-1071).
20. Judge Lee dismissed Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs
in the case and he dismissed Mr. Henshaw's claims for intentional interference with
economic relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conversion or
theft. (Record at 1068-1070).
21. Judge Lee also granted the Kings' claim that at most Mr. Henshaw could
only acquire one-half interest in the water sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings,
because the Water Deed given the Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that it
was a conveyance as joint tenants rather than tenants in common and there was no
evidence that Mrs. Watrous acquired Mr. Watrous interest in the water upon his
death. (Record at 1068-1070).
22. Judge Lee then permitted the trial to go forward with Mr. Henshaw as
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the sole plaintiff and assert his claims that he had an easement to connect the 3-inch
waterline to the Kings' 6-inch waterline and to use the 6-inch waterline to water his
property, and that the Kings did in fact sell water rights to the Watrouses which
rights were sold to Mrs. Henshaw and then to Mr. Henshaw. (Record at 10701071).
23. At conclusion of the trial the jury found that Mr. Henshaw was not
entitled to use the water the Kings had sold to the Watrouses and conveyed to him
by the Warranty DeedsfromMildred Watrous to Mrs. Henshaw andfromMrs.
Henshaw to him. (Record at 1073-1074).
24. However, the jury found that Kings had in fact sold waterrightsto the
Watrouses and that those waterrightswere transferred to Mr. Henshaw by the
Warranty Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Mrs. Henshaw andfromMrs. Henshaw
to him and ruled that the Kings were not entitled to have the water rights quieted in
themselves. (Record at 1073-1074).
25. The Kings prepared an Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and sent
a copy of the proposed order to Mr. Henshaw's counsel on or about May 4, 2006.
(Record at 1074).
26. Mr. Henshaw's counsel objected to the proposed order on motions for
directed verdict on May 15, 2006. However, that objection was not entered until
May 18, 2006. Nonetheless, the Kings admit that the Objection was served on them
-13-

on May 15, 2006. (Record at 1079-1081).
27. The Kings' counsel responded to Mr. Henshaw's objection to the
proposed order on motions for directed verdict on or about May 22, 2006. (Record
at 1091-1110).
28. The Court issued a memorandum decision on Mr. Henshaw's objection
to the proposed order on motions for directed verdict on June 19, 2006. (Record at
1125-1128).
29. In the Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court stated that it had signed
and entered the proposed order on motions for directed verdict on May 15,2006.
(Record at 1125-1128).
30. This was the first time either Mr. Henshaw or his counsel learned that the
Court had signed and entered the proposed order on motions for directed verdict.
(Record at 1139-1143).
31. Neither the Kings nor their counsel ever sent Mr. Henshaw or his counsel
a "Notice of Judgment" on the proposed order on motions for directed verdict as
required by Rule 58A(d) URCP. (Record at 1072-1456).
32. Upon learning that the Court had signed and entered the proposed order
on motions for directed verdict on May 15, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to
Alter or Amend under Rule 59 URCP, claiming that the Court had improperly
signed and entered the proposed order on motions for directed verdict because the
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time for him to file an objection to the proposed order on motions for directed
verdict had not yet expired. This Motion was filed on July 27, 2006. (Record at
1139-1143).
33. On September 13, 2006, the Court denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to
Alter or Amend based on its conclusions that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP
are not binding on district courts, and that under the provisions of Rules 59, it could
not extend the time to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment or order. (Record
at 1171-1172).
34. On September 28, 2006, Mr. Henshaw then filed a Motion For Relief
Under Rule 60(b), asking the Court to set aside the Order on Motions for Directed
Verdict, claiming that the Kings deliberately failed to notify him that the Order on
Motions for Directed Verdict had been entered and responded to his Objection to
the Proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict in order to prevent him from
learning that the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict had been entered in time to
file an appealfromthe Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. (Record at 11751176).
35. On November 15, 2006, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision
denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion for Relief Under Rule 60(b) holding that Mr.
Henshaw was not sufficiently diligent in determining if the Order on Motions for
Directed Verdict had in fact been signed and entered and that the provisions of Rule
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7(f)(2) URCP are not binding on district courts. (Record at 1209-1213).
36. Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2006, and that
appeal was assigned case No. 20061175-CA. (Record at 1215-1216).
37. On November 23, 2007, the Court of Appeals entered a memorandum
decision stating that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Mr. Henshaw's argument
that the trial court erred in ruling that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights,
the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's
death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. However, the Court of Appeals did not
address or rule on Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the Kings did not have standing to
even assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred
Watrous upon Raymond's death or that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
even rule upon the Kings assertion that Raymond's interest in the water rights did
not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, because the Kings lacked
standing to even assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. (Record at 1248-1258).
38. After the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur in case No. 20061175CA, Mr. Henshaw file a motion to vacate that portion of the trial court's directed
verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings admit
they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death
and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. (Record at 1259-1260).
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39. On July 18, 2008, the trial court issued a memorandum decision and
order denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate, stating that Mr. Henshaw's
Motion to Vacate was not timely. However, the trial court, for the third time,
refused to address Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the Kings do not have standing to
assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred
Watrous upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. The trial
court also refused to address Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the trial court does not
even have jurisdiction to even consider the Kings assertion that Raymonds' interest
in the water did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death and ultimately
pass to Mr. Henshaw, because the Kings do not have standing to even assert that
Raymonds' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. (Record at 1391-1393).
40. Mr. Henshawfiledhis Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court
from the trial court's denial of his Motion to Vacate on August 15, 2008. (Record
at 1438).
41. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court on
September 23, 2008. (Record at Volume 6, left side, third page).

-17-

VIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the
Kings' motion for a directed verdict, claiming that only one-half of the water rights
they sold to the Watrouses passed to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous'
death. The trial court also committed prejudicial and reversible error, and abused its
discretion, when it failed to set aside that portion of its directed verdict holding that
only one-half of the water rights they sold to the Watrouses passed to Mildred
Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death.

IX
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION FOR RELIEF
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B)(4) URCP AND WHEN IT DENIED
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S MAY 15, 2006 DIRECTED VERDICT, HOLDING
THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS
THAT THE KINGS ADMIT THEY SOLD TO THE WATROUSES,
WHICH MRS. WATROUS THEREAFTER SOLD TO BARBARA
HENSHAW AND BARBARA HENSHAW THEN SOLD TO DEE
HENSHAW, DID NOT PASS TO DEE HENSHAW, BECAUSE THE
KINGS LACKED STANDING TO EVEN ASSERT THAT RAYMOND
WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS
TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND WATROUS'S DEATH
AND ULTIMATELY TO MR. HENSHAW.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S MAY 15, 2006 DIRECTED VERDICT, HOLDING THAT
RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS THAT
THE KINGS ADMIT THEY SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, WHICH
MRS. WATROUS THEREAFTER SOLD TO BARBARA HENSHAW AND
BARBARA HENSHAW THEN SOLD TO DEE HENSHAW, DID NOT PASS
TO DEE HENSHAW, BECAUSE THE KINGS LACKED STANDING TO
EVEN ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE
WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON
RAYMOND WATROUS'S DEATH AND ULTIMATELY TO MR.
HENSHAW.
A. MARSHALING OF FACTS:
The trial court made no factual findings to support its ruling that Raymond
Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the
Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. In his
Motion to Alter or Amend, Mr. Henshaw specifically asked the trial court to enter
factual findings so the appeals courts could understand how the trial court
determined that the Kings had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in,
or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. (Record 1137, 1162). However,
the trial court failed to do so. The trial court also failed to specify how the Kings
had standing to even assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the
water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond Watrous' death, when it ruled on Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion.
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(Record 1209-1214). The trial court also failed to specify how the Kings had
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water
rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond Watrous' death, when it ruled on Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate.
(Record 1154-1156). Therefore, there are no facts for Mr. Henshaw to martial to
support the trial court's ruling that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of,
the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous
upon Raymond Watrous'death. (Record 1391-1394).

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S MAY 15. 2006 DIRECTED VERDICT. HOLDING
THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS
THAT THE KINGS ADMIT THEY SOLD TO THE WATROUSES.
WHICH MRS. WATROUS THEREAFTER SOLD TO BARBARA
HENSHAW AND BARBARA HENSHAW THEN SOLD TO DEE
HENSHAW, DID NOT PASS TO DEE HENSHAW, BECAUSE THE
KINGS LACKED STANDING TO EVEN ASSERT THAT RAYMOND
WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO
MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND WATROUS'S DEATH AND
ULTIMATELY TO MR. HENSHAW.
1. Standing Is Jurisdictional:
In Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court
stated: "the moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court"
^9 Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist before a court
may entertain a controversy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, 1)72, 154
P. 3d 808. Without the jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no
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authority to act. See, e.g., Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air
Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, V 7, 148 P. 3d 960 ("Utah standing law 'operates
as gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing in only those cases that are fit for
judicial resolution.'" (quoting Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands &
Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986))). (Emphasis added).
2007 P.3d (2007 UT App 154); Gedo v. Rose: 2007 UT App 154.

2. The Kings Have Not. And Cannot, Establish That They Ever Had
Standing. To Assert That Raymond Watrous' Interest In The Water Sold To
Watrouses Did Not Pass To Mildred Watrous At The Time Of Raymonds'
Death.
u

Anyone bringing an original proceeding—a dispute that is being presented

to the courts for the first time—must satisfy the traditional standing test" Jenkins
v. Swan. 675 P.2dat 1148, 1151 (Utah 1983).
Our generally stated standing rule is that a plaintiff must have suffered
n
some distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or her] a personal stake
in the outcome of the legal dispute. "(fn3) Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,
1148 (Utah 1983); accord Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County
Board of Health, 709 P. 2d at 1162; Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County,
702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985); see Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah
1978). The needfor such a personal stake frequently is described as a
requirement that the plaintiff s injury be ''particularized." The traditional
standing requirement is generally justified on grounds that in the absence of
a requirement that a plaintiff have a "personal stake in the outcome11 or a
"particularized injury," the courts might permit themselves to be drawn into
disputes that are not fit for judicial resolution or amount to "generalized
grievances that are more appropriately directed to the legislative and
executive branches of the state government. "Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d at
1149; see Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P. 2d at
798-99; Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978). (fn4) (Emphasis
added).
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Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter v. Vullock: 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah
1987).
As a general proposition the right to commence a legal proceeding depends
on the plaintiffs' suffering an injury to a legally protected right for which the
law provides a remedy. Absent such a showing, there is no right to complain
in the courts. (fn2)
Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746 (Utah 1982), citing Jenkins v. State. Utah,
585 P.2d 442 (1978).
One aspect of general standing doctrine we share with the federal courts is
the basic requirement that the complainant show f,,some distinct and
palpable injury that gives him [or her] a personal stake in the outcome of
the legal dispute.'"
Provo City Corp. v. WilldeiL 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989).
Utah law requires that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest in
the subject matter of the dispute in order to confer standing upon them. See
Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P. 2d 796, 798 (Utah
1986). Either party, or the court on its own motion, may properly raise the
issue of standing for the first time on appeal Blodgett v. Zions First NafI
Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). (Emphasis added).
Wade v. Burke. 800 P.2d 1106 OJt. App. 1990).
In Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections 89 P.3d 171 (Utah 2004),
the Utah Supreme Court again discussed the applicable standards for standing in
Utah. In Bonneville, the Supreme Court specifically held that:
As a general rule, a person can sustain a cause of action only where
he has sustained some injury to his legal personal or property rights,
the injury and the cause of action being contemporaneous." 1A CJ.S.
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Actions §32a (1985); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983).
(Emphasis added).
A plaintiff who has not been granted standing to sue by statute must either
show that he has or would suffer a "distinct and palpable injury that gives
rise to a personal stake in the outcome" of the case or meet one of the two
exceptions to standing recognized in cases involving "important public
issues." Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ^j
17, 82 P. 3d 1125.
2006 P.3d (2006 UT 36); In the Matter of E.H. |49.; 2006 UT 36.
In general, standing is available only to a person who has sustained some
injury to her legal, personal, or property rights. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d
1145, 1148 (Utah 1983).
150, id.
In this case, the Kings have not, and cannot, show that they have standing to
assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did
not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death.
In order for the Kings to assert that they have standing to claim the Raymond
Watrous' interest in the water they sold to Watrouses did not passed to Mildred at
the time the Raymond's death, the Kings would have to show that they are an
" interested persons," that they are heirs of Raymond Watrous, that they are
children of Raymond Watrous, that they are devisees of Raymond Watrous, that
they are creditors of Raymond Watrous, or that they are others having a property
riglit in or claim against the estate of Raymond Watrous' estate, as defined in UCA
§75-1-201.
"Interestedpersons" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against the
estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceedings. U.C.A.,
1953, §75-1-201(20) (1978 ed).
When a statute creates a cause of action and designates those who may sue
Under it. none except those designated may sue. Berry Properties v. City of
Commerce City. Colo.App., 667P.2d247(1983). (Emphasis added).
In Re: Estate of Peterson. 716 P.2d 801 (Utah 1986).
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The present version of the Utah Probate Code specifies as follows:
"Interestedperson" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a
trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person, it also
includes persons having priority for appointment as personal representative,
other fiduciaries representing interested persons, a settlor of a trust, if
living, or the settlor's legal representative, if any, if the settlor is living but
incapacitated. The meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from
time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes
of and matter involved in, any proceeding. UCA § 75-1-201.
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that the Kings cannot satisfy the
requirements of the Utah probate code to show that they are "interested persons" as
mandated in the Utah Probate Code in order to file a claim against the estate of
Raymond Watrous. The Kings have not claimed, and cannot claim, that they all are
li

heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries'' of Raymond Watrous,

or that they are "others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or
the estate of1 of Raymond Watrous. Therefore, the Kings cannot, and have not,
established that they have standing, or would have had standing, to assert that
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to
Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding.
Because, as a matter of law, the Kings do not, and did not, have standing to
assert that Raymond Watrous5 interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did
not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding, they
cannot establish that they have any right to assert in a collateral proceeding that
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to
Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death. The Kings cannot obtain more legal rights in
a collateral proceeding than they would have in a direct probate proceeding.
Therefore, the Kings have no standing to assert in this proceeding that the water
they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death.
Because the Kings do not have standing to assert, in this proceeding, that the
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water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's
death, this court's Order on Motions for the point in Directed Verdict mling that Mr.
Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water sold by the Kings to
Watrouses is void as a matter of law, and must be vacated.
3. Because The Kings Never Had Standing. And Do Not Have Standing. To
Assert That Raymond Watrous' Interest In The Water Rights Sold To
Watrouses Did Not Pass To Mildred Watrous At The Time Of Raymond
Watrouses Death. This Court Never Had Jurisdiction To Hear Or Rule On
The Kings Claim That Raymond Watrous' Interest In The Water Rights Sold
To Watrouses Did Not Pass To Mildred Watrous The Time Of Raymond's
Death.
As previously established in this Brief, standing is jurisdictional. Jenkins v.
Swan and Gedo v. Rose, supra. Because the Kings have not established, and
cannot, establish, that they have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous5 interest
in the water rights, sold to the Watrous by the Kings, did not pass to Mildred
Watrouses upon Raymond death, that portion of this court's Order on Motions for
Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest
in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law, and must be
vacated.
Any order entered by a court, without proper jurisdiction, is void as a matter
of law. "[T]he moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court. " Jenkins v. Swan, supra.
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist before a court may
entertain a controversy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20. <\12. 154 P.3d
808. Without the jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no
authority to act. (Emphasis added).
°
Gedo v. Rose, supra.
Because the Kings do not have standing to even assert that Raymond
Watrous' interest in the water rights the Kings sold to him and Mildred Watrous did
not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death, the trial court never had
jurisdiction to even hear or rule on the Kings claim that Raymond's interest in the
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water rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death. Because the
trial court never had jurisdiction to hear or rule on the Kings claim that Raymond's
interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death,
the trial court committed plain, prejudicial and reversible error when it denied Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate that portion of the trial court's directed verdict holding
that Raymonds' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of
Raymond's death, is void as a matter of law. Therefore, this Court must reverse
that portion of the trial court's directed verdict holding that Raymonds' interest in
the water rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death and remand
this case back to the trial court directing it to vacate the portion of its directed
verdict holding that Raymonds' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred
at the time of Raymond's death.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR.
HENSHAW'S RULE 60b MOTION.
A. MARSHALING OF FACTS: The trial court made no factual findings in
denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion to Vacate. Therefore, there are no facts
for Mr. Henshaw to martial to support the trial court's ruling that Raymond
Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the
Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death.
(Record 1391-1394).
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR.
HENSHAW'S RULE 60B MOTION TO VACATE.
In its July 8, 2008 Memorandum Decision, the trial court states:
The plaintiffs' Motion to vacate is based on Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. The Motion seeks a ruling voiding a portion of the
directed verdict entered on 15 May 2006 against the plaintiffs. The basis
advanced in support of this Motion is that the defendants did not have
-26-

standing to argue that the water nght in this case did no' ^ ; • v *-o I
Raymond Watrous to his wife,
A motion under Rule 60(b (4) must be filed within a reasonable time. In this
case the plaintiffs' current Motion was filed approximately 21 months after
entry of the directed verdict, after decision on other post-trial motions, and
following an appeal The Court concludes the Motion is simp I)> not timeh;
because it was not filed within a reasonable time.
There can be no legitimate claim :>ur standing is a i lew issue. Both parties
agree that the plaintiff argued stcn.i -.g at the time of trial. The plaintiffs
also raised standing in their Motion to Alter or Amend, filed June 23, z006.
The issue was raised again in the plaintiffs' appellate brie/filed some time
in December 2006. However, the plaintiffs waited until 6 February 2008 to
bring this Motion to Vacate based on lack: of standing.
The Court finds the plaintiffs' delay in raising this issue is unreasonable.
Thus the plaintiffs' Motion should be denied as untimely. (Record at 1393).
The trial vvun^ ruling that Mr lienshaw's Motion to Vacaio was not timely

prejudicial and reversible error for the trial court, to even assert that there is a time
limit for vacating a void judgment.
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o- w-^d \ atrous vi.,; not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, void as a matter
of law, and a void judgment can never become a valid judgment through the passage
of time.
In State v. Vaidez. 65 P.3d 1191(Ct. App. 2003), the Utah Court of Appeals
stated: '"> .;v we it-settledthat subject matter jurisdiction may nc raised at tn * -v. ,
hy eilhtr ^any ur the court. See State v. Rerank, 858 P.2d 927, 95u (Lian iyy^j. "'
Standing, of course, is an issue that is never waived and can be raised hy
any party or by the court at any time. See Terracor, ~* 16 P. 2d at 798;
Stromqulst 646 P. 2d at 747; Wade v. Burke, 800 " 7J 'jot ijnRrn ^
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CtApp. 1990); Blodgett v. lions First Nafl Bank 752 P.2d 901, 904
(UtahCt.App.1988).
In re: Estate of Hunt 842 P.2d 872 (Utah 1992).
In Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
declared:
Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well
present a difficult question, but when that question is resolved, the court
must act accordingly.
By the same token, there is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void.
The one-year [three-month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b)
motions is expressly inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion
be made within a "reasonable time." which seems literally to apply to
motions under Rule 60(b)(4). cannot be enforced with regard to this class of
motion. A voidjudgment cannot acquire validity because of laches on the
part of the judgment debtor. (Emphasis added).
Because there is no time limit for filing a challenge to the jurisdiction of a
court, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate based on the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction was timely and proper, and the trail court's assertion that Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate was "simply not timely because it was not filed within
a reasonable time, " is prejudicial and reversible error.
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when
subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court
can do anything to fill that void.
Crump v. Crump. 821 P.2d 1172 (Ut. App. 1991), see also. 44 P.3d 724; Housing
Authority of the City of Salt Lake v. Snyder: 2002 UT 28, 67 P.3d 1055; Fisher v.
Fisher: 2003 UT App 91 and Curtis v. Curtis. 790 P.2d 717 (Ut. App. 1990).
Because the trial court based its ruling that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate,
under Rule 60(b)(4) URCP, "should be denied as untimely, " for, as the trial court
incorrectly concluded: "A motion under Rule 60(b(4) must be filed within a
reasonable time, " without regard for clear and controlling Utah case law holding
that:
[Tlhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The one-year
[three-month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is
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expressly inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made
within a "reasonable time," which seems literally to apply to motions under
Rule 60(b)(4), cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. Garcia
v. Garcia, supra,
because <s:^\vA'i is

; o^ooriau uedo v Rose, supra, and because alack of
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verdict holding that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred
at the time of Raymond's death.
Because the trial court based its ruling that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate,
under Rule 60(b)(4) URCP, ushould be denied as untimely, " because the trial court
incorrectly concluded: "A motion under Rule 60(b (4) must be filed within a
reasonable time, " without regard for clear and controlling Utah case law holding
that:
[Tlhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The one-year
[three-month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is
expressly inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made
within a "reasonable time," which seems literally to apply to motions under"
Rule 60(b)(4), cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion.
Garcia v. Garcia, supra, because standing is jurisdictional, Gedo v. Rose, supra,
and because a lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, Crump v.
Crump, supra, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it
denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate, under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(4)
URCP, based on its incorrect conclusion that "A motion under Rule 60(b)(4) must
be filed within a reasonable time, " and on its incorrect conclusion that Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate was untimely, under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(4)
URCP. Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Henshaw's
Motion to Vacate and remand this case back to the trial court with instructions to
grant Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate.
Respectfully submitted this 18th

day of May 2009.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Dee Henshaw
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Charles A. Schultz, #4760
Attorney for Dee and Dana Henshaw
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: 435.225.2636

IN THE SIXTH JUDIC1AI DISTRICT! Ol RT OF W W N I ( Ul i\ l \
ST4TEOF1TA1!
DEE HENSHAW

MOTION TO VACATE

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE ESTATE Of | U'K KIM J

I n ! V-.

! M-

| . ( : "

!

Defendant.

COMHS Ni j«Vv ucc Henshaw and, pursuant to the provisions of .Rale 60(b) UR.CP
"this Court to vacate rhaf portion ill ( iln itdeot(aiif> i i<K i mi vlniious lot Directed ••

Matftntott

. 2

rmn^s

Verdict ruling that Mr, Henshaw did not acquire any rights title or interest in the water sold by the
Kings to Watrouses, on the ground that die portion of the defendants' Order on Motions for
Directed Verdict mling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water
sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law.
This Motion is also based on the memorandum filed in support of this Motion and the
Exhibits attached thereto.

WHEREFORE, Dee Henshaw moves this Court to vacate that portion all of the
defendants' Order on Motions for Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any
right, title or interest in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses

Respectfully submitted this y /fifty of January 2008,

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Dee Henshaw
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Charles A. Schultz, #4760
Attorney for Dee Henshaw
222 West 700 South
Bngham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: 435.225.2636

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WAYNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DEE HENSHAW

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTYON TO VACA TE

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF JACK KING,
Defendant.
,uug

W.

L.^«w-

<Y)MI;S N<">\\ !)tv iieiisluiw anil submits Ihe Iolluwmg Memorandum Tn Suri^n ^rhi>
Motion to Vacate that portion of the ddVtulanfY < }uki

. vW w • *.I'u w>t i l i i l l i g

that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the *ater -^'* r- *i< K, mas111
in 'uses.
ffflUt

ST A TEMENT OF FA CTS
1. At the close of the Plaintiffs" case, the Court orally granted in part the defendants"
motion for a directed verdict.
2. As a part of the Court's grant of a directed verdict in favor of the defendants, the Court
ruled that Mr, Henshaw did not acquire any right title or interest in the water or water rights
deeded to Raymond Watrous, and that Raymond Watrous"' interest in the water and/or water
rights, deeded to the Watrouses by the defendants, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon the
death of Raymond Watrous.
3. On or about May 4. 2006. the defendants filed it proposed directed verdict with the
Court.
4. On May 15, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed an objection to the defendants" proposed
directed verdict
5. On May 15. 2006. the Court signed and entered the defendants" proposed directed
verdict
6. From the first time that the Kings raised their claim that Raymond Watrous" interest in
the water the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred upon Raymonds death,
through the oral arguments and on the Kings motion for directed verdict that Raymond Watrous'
is interest in the water rights the Kings sold to Watrouses did not pass to Mildred upon
Raymond"s death, Mr. Henshaw has repeatedly and continual!}' asserted that the Kings do not
have, and never had, standing to claim that the water nghts the Kings sold to the Watrouses did

V-u-

not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death,
• 7

Mi". Hensiiaw specifically argued at the hearing on the Kings' motion for directed

v^idicnha' Ihr Kin»s did i»"l ha\r slandmg lo ttsseil that kayrnond Watrouses interest in the water
rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to .vlnu^

*•

None-the-less. the court granted the Kings motion for directed verdict and ruled that

• ,r- ;r.i ••• ••A * :\u wu -, i,.,.:, ; u. UIL water "the water, that '"(lie Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not
pass to Mildred upon Raymond death itihl w ilhoul i^plammt» h*\\\ Ihr u»int tick mimed (hat the
Kings had standing to even assert that Raymond Watrouses interest in the water did not pass to
Mildred upon Raymond s death

refused to specify how it determined 'that the Kings had standing to assert that Ra) ' n ic nd Watrous'
interest in the water did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond death.
In II in- undisputed Unit .HI iiltt linn" ill lh"ii\ mom) W.tfiotis ik'iilli the Kings were not
heirs, devisees, beneficiaries, or creditors of Mr. Watrous nr of hi'-i estate.
11,. Tt is undisputed that neither at the time Watrouses death, nor at any time after his
'sw

- ^ a-.-.-v - • s

. . w against, either Raymond Watrous or his estate.
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ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE KINGS NEVER HAD STANDING TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND
WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS SOLD TO WATROUSES DTD NOT
PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND WATROUSES
DEATH, THIS COURT NEVER HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR OR RULE ON THE
KINGS CLATM THAT RAYMOND WATROUS INTEREST TN THE WATER RIGHTS
SOLD TO WATROUSES DTD NOT PASS TO MTLDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF
RAYMOND WATROUSES DEATH, THEREFORE, THAT PORTION OF THE
DIRECTED VERDICT RULING THAT MR. HENSHAW DID NOT ACQUIRE ANY
Right, title OR INTEREST TO THE WATER SOLD BY THE KINGS TO THE
WATROUS TS VOTD AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THEREFORE MUST BE
VACATED.
POTNTT
STANDING TS JURISDICTIONAL
Tn Jenkins v. Sweat, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "the
moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court."
^9 Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist, before a court may entertain a
controversy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 LIT 20, J12, 154 P.SdHOH. Without the
jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no authority to act. See, e.g.. Utah
Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, V7, 148 P. 3d 960 ("Utah
standing law 'operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing in only those cases that
are fit for judicial resolution.'" (quoting Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry,
716 P. 2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986))). (Emphasis added).
2007 P.3d (2007 UT App 154); Gedo v. Rose: 2007 UT App 154.

POINT il
THE KINGS HAVE NOT, AND CANNOT, ESTABLISH THAT THEY EVER HAD
STANDING, TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER
SOLD TO WATROUSES DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF
RAYMONDS' DEATH.
"Anyone bringing an original proceeding—a dispute that is being presented to the courts

6 .,.

for the first rime—nwsi satisfy the traditional standing test" Jenkins v. Swan, 675 V V» ;tl 1 I4'K
•

ui

ivh/ .

Our generally slated standing rule is that a ptumi. l <n: v *iave suffered "some distinct and
palpable injury thai gives him [or her] a personal stak, ui the outcome of the legal
dispute. "(fti3) Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d II45, 1148 (Ltah 1983); accord Utah Restaurant
Association ti Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d at 1162; Kennecoii Corp. v. Salt
Lake County, 702 R2d45l\ 454 (Utah 1985); see Bairdv. State, 574 R2d 713 (Utah
1978). The need for such a personal stake frequently Is described as a requirement that the
plaintiffs injury be "particularized." The traditional standing requirement is generally
justified on grounds thai In the absence of a requirement that a plaintiff have a "personal
stake in the outcome" or a "particularized injury, " the courts might permit themselves to
be drawn Into disputes thai are not fit for judicial resolution or amount to "generalized
grievances that are more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches
of the state government "Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d at 1149; see Terracor R Utah Board
of State Lands & Forestry, 7I6R2dat 798-99; Bairdv. State, 574 P,2d 713, 717 (I ltah
JQ7X) fihA\ ''Fmphasis added).
Society of 'Professional Journalists, • blah Chapter R Hillock 711 P "><•! Ikiofl \*
As a general proposition the right to commence a legal proceeding depenas on the
plaintiffs1 suffering cm injur}} to a legally protected right for which the law provides a
remedy Absent such a showing, there is no right to complain in the courts, (fn2)
Stromquist \>\ (j)kavm\ (>K) P 7d n Kill lulu H f ^ t ciiini«

IM I «. v H,MI I laii v> • i . a i i l

(1978).
One aspect of general standing doctrine we share with the federal courts is the basic •
requirement that the complainant show '"some distinct and palpable injury that gives him
for her J a personal slake in (he outcome of the legal dispute/ff
n

r'M> Ciiy (7;r~

Willden, 768 P.2d 455 (Utah J989),

• •-• -i/w requires that the parties to a. lawsuit have a sufficient, interest in the subject
•'•< 'iter of the dispute in order to confer standing upon them. See Terracor v. Utah Bd. of
State Lands & Forestry, 716 P. 2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986). Either party or the court on Us
own motion may properly raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal. Blodgett

v. Zions First Natl Bank 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah CtApp. J988). (Emphasis added).
Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Ut App. 1990).
In Raymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections 89 P.3d 171 (Utah 2004), the Utah
Supreme Court again discussed the applicable standards for standing in Utah. In Bonneville, the
Supreme Court specifically held that:
As a general rule, a person can sustain a cause of action only where he has
sustained some injury to his legal personal or property rights, the injury and the
cause of actum being contemporaneous. " J A C.J.S. Actions § 32a (I985); Jenkins v.
Swan 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). (Emphasis added).
A plaintiff who has not been granted standing to sue by statute must either show that he
has or would suffer a "distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the
outcome" of the case or meet one of the two exceptions to standing recognized in cases
involving "important public issues. " Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist v. Morgan,
2003 UT58, 1| 17, 82P.3dU25.
2006 P.3d (2006 UT 36); In Die Matter of KM. ^|49.; 2006 UT 36.
In general standing is available only to a person who has sustained some injury to her
legal personal or property rights. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d1145, 1148 (Utah 1983).

150, id.
in this case, the Kings have not and cannot show that they have standing to assert that
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death.
In order for the Kings to assert that they have standing to claim the Raymond Watrous7
mterest in the water they sold to Watrouses did not passed to Mildred at the time the Raymond's
death, the Kings would have to show that "interestedpersons " as defined in the Utah Probation
Code. i.e.. they are heirs of Raymond Watrous. children of Raymond Watrous, devisees of

?

Raymond Watrous, creditors of Raymond Watrous, or others ha, inu n nt^nem r^\ < m or claim
against the estate of Ravmond Wntrnn-:" ^st;in\
1

"Interestedpersons "' includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries,
and any others having a property right in or claim against the estate of a decedent which
may he affected by the proceedings. 'U.C.A., 1953, § 75-]~20J(20) (1978 ed.).
When a statute creates a cause of action and designates those who max? sue under it none
except
those designated may? sue. Berry Properties v. City of Commerce City, Colo.App.,
66'7P2d?4'rnQ*u
fF.mphasis added),
In Re: Estate of Peterson. 716 P Jd 801 (Utah 1986).
:

i in. '!«.•>• *

PndiMU I mit specifics «J> iioflows:

'Interestedperson" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries,
and any others ha\>ing a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a
decedent, ward, or protected person. It also includes persons liaving priority for
appointment as personal representative, other fiduciaries representing interested persons,
a settlor of a trust, if living, or the settlor's legal representative, if any, if the settlor is
living hut incapacitated. The meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from,
time to time and shall he determined according to the particular purposes of ana matter
involved in,. any proceeding. UCA § 75-1 -201 (24).
Tn the instant -rr\r. •'

•

•• • •

. • v .

.

(J,{,M

_ the requirements oi the

I'tah pi ubitti" code to show mat U\L\ die interested peisoiib " as mandated in the Utah Probate
Code in order to file a claim against the estate of Raymond Watrous. The Kings mx i m n
,4;

- " /.,,,,,.t'

claimed, and ca^r-* ^aim thiil lhr\ ill -IP

. mlaren, spouses, creditors,

hrth-u^.^r;. • .->; :\dymond Watrous,, or thai rhe\ are """• >WITS hmnng a property right >-r. r , '.ami
against u try sr estate <*r ?hv '/<ro(>

'*"' of Raym^n*! Watrou*

have not. establish*;-* **.v »•,- » .

r

he'*?forc. *^ K'IW-

..-'.•'

^ „namii. :\ assen that Raymond

W aii oils' interest in tl le water they sold to the Watroizses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at
Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding.
T

V a*.

-*

d not have standing to assert that

Raymonc A ai;ou> r-ueresi in rhe water thev sold :o rho vv'atrouses iui noi :r&$^ u> \fddred
Watrous at Raymond's death, in any probate proceeds
;
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•

* ^*a *

right to assert in a collateral proceeding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to
the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding.
The Kings cannot obtain more legal rights in a collateral proceeding than they would have in a
direct probate proceeding. Therefore, the Kings have no standing to assert in this proceeding that
the water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous ait Raymond's death.
Because the Kings do not have standing to assert, in this proceeding, that the water they
sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death, this court's Order on
Motions for the point in Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title
or interest in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law, and must be
vacated.
POINT m
BECAUSE THE KINGS NEVER HAD STANDING, AND TO NOT HAVE STANDING,
TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS
SOLD TO WATROUSES DID NOT PASS TO MTLDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF
RAYMOND WATROUSES DEATH, THIS COURT NEVER HAD JURISDICTION
TO
HEAR OR RULE ON THE KINGS CLAIM THAT RAYMOND WATROUS9 INTEREST
IN THE WATER RIGHTS SOLD TO WATROUSES DTD NOT PASS TO MTLDRED
WATROUS AT THE TTME OF RAYMOND'S DEATH.
As previously established in this memorandum, standing is jurisdictional. Jenkins v. Swan
and Gedo v. Rose, supra.
Because the Kings have not established, and cannot, established that they have standing to
assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, sold to the Watrous by the Kings, did
not pass to the Watrouses at Raymond death, that portion of this court's Order on Motions for
Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water
sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law, and must be vacated.
Any order entered by a court, without proper jurisdiction, is void as a matter of law.
"the moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. " Jenkins v. Swan,
supra.
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist before a court may entertain a

/0-s-

contwptersy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, Ij'U 154 P. 3d 808. Without the
jurisdictional requirement ofstanding, a court has no authority to act (Emphasis added).
Geda v. Rose, supra
CONlLL'SiU.'V

Because the Kings have not, and cannot, < sur- .-. iiat thi s an: interested paj lies, ua
defined in'the Utah, probate code, they cannot establish that they have standing to assert that
r

>wr...^;: '•• • -!:" •

h;,::.v .i, t... .wiier ngnk. UACV M>JJ to Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred

uponRajmoaaacatii. iieca"-,

J

'

•-IKS ?:ioceecmig,

Raymond Watrous' interest in. the water rights, they sold to the vv atrou -

•

to assert that
:>

> \ J «aiec: upon ici> ;:iona death, tliis court lacked jurisdiction to hear, and rule upon, the Kings
claim'thatRaymond WHimns' infcresl m llie watt* righrs ihe kings sold to the Watrouses did not
pass to Mildred up one Raymond death. Because this court failicd jurisdiction to heai .ino i nit.
upon "the .Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights sold to the Watrouses
did not pass in MiUrul LI|H >n Ka\ luoud death, that portion of this court's Order on Motions for
Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Menshaw did not iuitniT i»> rigJn lifle .>• diteieM ui Hie water
sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law. and must be vacated.

Dated I M K f

i\n\

* ';a;:es A. Schultz
attorney for Dee Hen^w, Ar
/ /
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MAY 2 7 2008
Charles A. Schultz, #4760
Attorney for Dee Henshaw
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: 435.225.2636

6TH DISTRICT/ -,OUF. '

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WAYNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DEE HENSHAW

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO VACATE

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF JACK KING,

Civil No. 00600007

Defendant.

Judge: Lee

COMES NOW, Dee Henshaw and submits the following Reply Memorandum In Support of his
Motion to Vacate that portion of the defendants' Order on Motions for Directed Verdict ruling that Mr.
Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses

/ ^

SUPPLEMENTAL
1

STATEMENT

Ot

FACJS

The defendants initially asserted, in their memorandum in opposition to \ !•

]

^ ••'- -•

x j

>•

hi Nr.K':i1 *.•, lli.il Mi Henshawnever asserted during the oral argument on the defendant's motion for a
!

directed verdict, that the defendants did and/or do in

.

-.NM

; i\u>mond

Watrous5s interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to Raymond and Mildred Watrous, did not pass to
Mildred upon R/-*

'•'

• •

:

i

-

- ,\.

-..

\.. ; .cnsiiaw's Motion to Enlarge, the

•defendants now admit that Mr. Henshaw did. in fact argue, during the oral argument nn flic ilffendnnt's
ninlion fin a dneciaJ verdict, that the defendants did and/rr dr not have standing to standing to assert that
Raymond Watrous's interest in the water risjfih l In- Kiir: • *

.-

\ watrous, did not

pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death. See the defendants; memorandum in onoosition to enlarge time to
filerer1, ^""'^anduni page J,, }\ I J ivp, ul nlutli is attached to I his Memorandum as Exhibit 1.
• 1

' : his deposition on August 23, 2004, Jack King made the followine, ,idmisMi nis

Q. Okay, 1 hen you're admitting here today, for
4 the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3
nours full flow ofPinecreek water?
o
A. Every 18 days,
7
O. Every 13 days; is that correct?
8
A. That's right

idef i i,ith

3

24

. -••ajrv.

u>
25
Are you now .iunninn^ .tien
1 plaintiffs have the ri<?^f '• *'• • v~'>- ^
sek
t
2 for irrigation
3
A. They ~ they have 3 hou10-: Wv<-"*v ,v- /.* 4 but not ;r;*" u;J> my pipeline.

14
15
16

(Page 5^)

tou've admitted that the Henshaws have the
:'fnt to use some water; correct?
?
-'^nt that they had the s*:<zht to use 3 hours

v

/3

..

(Pages 1" • I4 i

17 out of every 18 days.

(Page 22)

19 Q. Are you now admitting that Exhibit No. 1 is in
20 fact a water deedfor the sale of 3 hours ofPinecreek
21 water to Watresses?
22
A. Well yeah, they got 3 hours.
23
Q. Okay. I just want to make it crystal clear
24 here because this has been the problem from day one of
25 this.
1
A. It shouldn't have been because I've already
2 admitted that a long time ago.
3
Q. Okay. Then you're admitting here today, for
4 the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3
5 hours full flow of Pinecreek water?
6
A. Every 18 days.
7
Q. Every 18 days; is that correct?
8
A. That's right
9
Q. Okay. Great.

(Pages 58-59)

2
A. Well, you — you've already established with
3 Grace Potter that I deeded them over the three hours.
4
Q. You deeded them over the three hours?
5
A. That's right.
6
Q. Okay. So they own the three hours; is that
7 correct?
8
A. I guess they do.
9
Q. Okay. Excellent.

(Page 10)

25
Q. Are you now admitting, then, that the
1 plaintiffs have the right to use water from Pinecreek
2 for irrigation?
3
A. They ~ they have 3 hours of every 18 days,
4 but not through my pipeline.
5
Q. But not through your pipeline, okay.

(Pages 13-14)

13
Q. Let me rephrase it, then.
14 You've admitted that the Hens haws hcn>e the
15 right to use some water; correct?
16
A. I admit that they had the right to use 3 hours

>H
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17 out of every 18 days.
18
Q. Okay, fine. They had the right to use 3 hours
19 in 18 days.

(Page 22)

20
Q. How many people are you aware of that have
21 water rights on Pinecreek?
22
A. Just me and the State Fish and Game.
23
Q, You're not aware of anyone else?
24
A. Well, just Dee, got that 3 hours.
25
Q. All right Okay.

(Page 35)

Copies of the referenced pagesfromKing's deposition are attached to this Memorandum as Exhibit 2.
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ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE KINGS NEVER HAD STANDING TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS'
INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS SOLD TO WATROUSES DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED
WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND WATROUSES DEATH, THIS COURT NEVER
HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR OR RULE ON THAT CLAIM. THEREFORE, THAT
PORTION OF THE DIRECTED VERDICT RULING THAT MR. HENSHAW DID NOT
ACQUIRE ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST TO THE WATER SOLD BY THE KINGS TO
THE WATROUS IS VOID AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THEREFORE MUST BE VACATED.
POINT I
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION IS TIMELY
The defendants' assertion that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate is not timely is simply ridiculous,
and to even assert that there is a time limit for vacating a void judgment is an insult to the court and a
violation of the defendants' counsel's duty or\f candor and honesty to the court.
The defendants' assertion that this court was not divested of its jurisdiction to entertain and rule
upon a Rule 60 motion during the appeal of this matter, is true, but irrelevant, and their assertion that Mr.
Henshaw is now precluded from filing his Rule 60(b) motion because he did not file it during the pendency
of his appeal is also a deliberate misrepresentation of the law to the court. No Utah appellate court has
ever held that a party must file a Rule 60 motion while a case is on appeal or that he will be precluded from
filing such motion after the case has been remanded to the trial court.
The defendant's citations to various federal and state cases discussing what is a reasonable time to
file a Rule 60(b) motion, under the FRCP, are not only irrelevant, they are deliberately misleading. In none
of the cases cited by the defendants' was there an issue of the basic subject matter jurisdiction of the trial
court.
Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate is based on the undeniable fact that this court never had
jurisdiction to hear or rule on the defendants' claim that Raymond Watrous's interest in the water rights,
the Kings sold to Raymond and Mildred Watrous, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death. That
lack of jurisdiction makes that portion of the court's directed verdict, holding that the Raymond Watrous's

interest in the water rights Jack and Bonnie King sold to Raymond and Mildred Watrous did not pass to
Mildred upon Raymond's death, void as a matter of law, and a void judgment can never become a valid
judgment through the passage of time.
InState v. Valdez, 65 P.3d 1191(Ct. App. 2003), the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "It is wellsettled that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by either party or the court. See State v.
Perank, 858 P.2d927, 930 (Utah 1992). "
Standing, of course, is an issue that is never waived and can be raised by any party or by the court
at any time. See Terracor, 716 P. 2d at 798; Stromquist, 646 P. 2d at 747; Wade v. Burke, 800 P. 2d
1106, 1108 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah
Ct. App J 9 88).
In re: Estate of Hunt, 842 P.2d 872 (Utah 1992)
In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court declared:
Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well present a difficult
question, but when that question is resolved, the court must act accordingly.
By the same token, there is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The one-year [threemonth, in Utah] limit applicable to some Ride 60(b) motions is expressly inapplicable, and even
the requirement that the motion be made within a "reasonable time." which seems literally to
apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4). cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. A
voidjudgment cannot acquire validity because of laches on the part of the judgment debtor.
(Emphasis added).
Because there is no time limit for filing a challenge to the jurisdiction of a court, Mr. Henshaw's
Motion to Vacate based on this court's lack of jurisdiction is timely and proper.
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when subject matter
jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill that void.
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Ut. App. 1991), see also. 44 P.3d 724; Housing Authority of the City of
Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 67 P.3d 1055; FISHER v. FISHER; 2003 UT App 91 and Curtis v.
Curtis, 790 P.2d 717 (Ut. App. 1990).
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POINT n
THE DOCTRINE OF "DOCTRINE OF THE CASE" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO M R
HENSHAW MOTION TO VACATE.
The Kings assert that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate that portion of the directed verdict holding
that Raymond Watrous's interest in the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death is barred by the doctrine of the law of the case. That assertion is
absolute nonsense. It is spurious, disingenuous and is a breach of King's counsel's duty of candor and
honesty to the court to even make such a spurious assertion.
No court has ever ruled that the law of the case doctrine is superior to jurisdiction. Nothing is
superior to jurisdiction.
The defendants have not cited, and cannot cite, this court to any case holding that a lack of
jurisdiction can be over come by the doctrine of the law of the case, and claiming that it can is a deliberate
misrepresentation of the law to the court.
We have held that while defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived, subject matter jurisdiction
goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time and when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the
court can do anything to fill that void. (Emphasis added).
Crump v. Crump, supra.
[T]o entertain a dispute, a court must have jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the dispute
and the individuals involved. If the court lacks either type of jurisdiction, it has no power to
entertain the suit. See generally 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350
(1969). Moreover, while defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived, subject matter jurisdiction
goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action. Id. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. Id. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time and when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the
court can do anything to fill that void. Id. (Emphasis added).
Curtis v. Curtis, supra.
If the court does not have jurisdiction to act, nothing the court does, any order it issues, any
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holding it makes, or any issue it decides is valid, and it does not make any difference how long the
erroneous order^ holding or the improper decision has been in effect. Without jurisdiction, no order issued
by a court, no decision issued by a court or no holding of a court is ever valid.
A voidjudgment cannot subsequently become a validjudgment "Either a judgment is void or it is
valid. Determining which it is may well present a difficult question, but when that question is
resolved, the court must act accordingly." Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986)
(quoting 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2862 (1973)).
(Emphasis added).
Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374 (UT. App. 1994). "A voidjudgment cannot acquire validity because of
laches on the part of the judgment debtor. " Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986).
A divorced modification issued by a juvenile court will never become valid, under the doctrine of
the law of the case, because a juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to enter a modification of a divorce
decree. A boundary line determination in a real property dispute, determined by a small claims court, will
never be valid under the doctrine of the law of the case, because a small claims court does not have
jurisdiction over real property. A felony conviction, entered by a justice court, will never become a valid
judgment under the doctrine of the law of the case, because a justice court does not have jurisdiction over
felonies. A determination of immigration status by a state district court will never be valid, under the
doctrine of the law of the case, because only the federal courts have jurisdiction over immigration matters.
Likewise, because the defendants do not now have, and have never had, standing to assert that
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, that the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not
pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, this court lacks jurisdiction to even consider the Kings
claim that Raymond Watrous's interest in the water, rights that the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses,
did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. Therefore, that portion of the order on the
defendants' motion for a directed verdict, holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, that
Kings admit that they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death is
void as a matter of law, and can never become a valid order, under the doctrine of the law of the case. The

/f
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doctrine of law the case cannot make an order that was entered without jurisdiction a valid and enforceable
order, no matter how long the order has existed or may exist.
A void order can never become a valid order, no matter how long it may be in existence. An order
entered without jurisdiction to enter the order is a void order, and it will never become a valid order no
matter how long it may be in existence. See, Garcia v. Garcia and Jenkins v. Weis, supra. Therefore. Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate must be granted as a matter of law.
POINT HI
THE KINGS NEVER HAD STANDING, AND DO NOT HAVE STANDING, TO ASSERT THAT
RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS SOLD TO WATROUSES DID
NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND WATROUSES DEATH.
The defendants make the ridiculous claim that standing only applies to plaintiffs and not defendants.
It is true that standing does not apply to defendants, if their status in a legal proceeding is only that of a
defendant. However, if a defendant becomes a counterclaim plaintiff or a cross-claim plaintiff, the same
requirements for standing applies to the counterclaim defendant and cross-claim defendant as it does to a
plaintiff Any party, whether an original plaintiff, a counterclaim plaintiff or a cross-claim plaintiff is
required to prove he has standing to assert a claim.
As a part of both of their counterclaims, filed in conjunction with their answer, and their amended
answer, the Kings asserted a claim for quiet title. In those claims for quiet title, the Kings sought to have
the trial court rule that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of
Raymond's death. In pertinent part, both the Kings' counterclaim and amended counterclaim read as
follows:
Defendants Jack and Bonnie King counterclaim against Plaintiffs Barbara, Dee and Dana
Henshaw, as follows:
6. The Kings are the owners of certain water rights in and to Pine Creek including, but not
limited to, those rights represented by the Utah Division of Water Rights, Water Right nos, 951629 and 95-5 17.
7. The Plaintiffs claim an interest in the water rights adverse to the Kings. The Plaintiffs' claim
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is without any right whatever, and the Plaintiffs have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in or to
the water rights or any part of the water rights.
8. Since approximately July, 1992, the Plaintiffs have used and continue to use water from Pine
Creek
9. The Plaintiffs have no right to use water from Pine Creek, and their use of such water has
harmed the defendants.
WHEREFORE, the defendants request the Court:
L Require that the Plaintiffs, and all persons claiming under them, set forth the nature of their
claims to the water rights described herein,
2. Determine all adverse claims to the water rights described herein by decree of the Court
3. Declare that defendants Jack and Bonnie King, own in fee simple and are entitled to the quiet
and peaceful possession of the water rights described in this Complaint and that the Plaintiffs and
all persons claiming under them have no right to or interest in the water rights or any part
thereof
4. Permanently enjoin the Plaintiffs, each of them, and all persons claiming under them from
asserting any adverse claim to the Kings'title to the water rights, andfrom using any water from
Pine Creek (Emphasis added).
Because the Kings asserted counterclaims seeking to quiet title to the water rights they admit they
sold to the Watrouses, they were required to demonstrate that they had standing to assert those claims, i.e.,
that they had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at
the time of Raymond's death. The Kings did not do so, and they cannot do so. Therefore, the Kings
lacked standing to even ask the trial court to hear or consider their claim that Raymond Watrous5 water
rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, and the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to hear and rule upon the Kings' claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water did not
pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death.
In Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "the moving
party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court"1 Because the defendants asserted
1. Even assuming, arguendo, that Raymond Watrous' lA interest in the water, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death, it did not pass to the Kings, and the Kings have no standing, in this proceeding, to claim that Raymond
Watrous' Vi interest in the water did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. Whether Raymond's Vi
interest in the water passed VA to Mildred and 1/8 to each of his two children, 1/6 to Mildred and 1/6 to each of his two
children or passed to them in some other percentage, it is irrelevant in this proceeding. Whatever happened to Mr. Watrous'
Vi of the water, it did not pass to the Kings, and the Kings have no standing to assert possible claims to the ownership of the
water, or water rights, on the part of Mr. Watrous' children or any other person or entity in this proceeding. Likewise thev

counterclaims seeking to quiet title to the water rights, they admitted they sold to the Watrouses, the
defendants had, and have, the duty to prove that they have standing to ask this court to rule that Raymond
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. Because the
defendants have not done that, and cannot to that, this court does not have jurisdiction to even hear or
consider the Kings' claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time
of Raymond's death. Therefore, the directed verdict entered by this court, holding that Raymond Watrous'
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, is void as a matter of law,
and this court must grant Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate that portion of the Order on Motion for
Directed Verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time
of Raymond's death.
CONCLUSION
Because the Kings have not, and cannot, establish that they are interested parties, as defined in the
Utah Probate Code, they cannot establish that they have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest
in the water rights, the Kings admit they sold to Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond death.

have no standing to assert a claim that Raymond Watrous' lA interest in the water, did not pass to Mildred Watrous on behalf
of the public at large.
The Kings have not, and cannot, show any legal or equitable interest in Raymond's lA interest in the water. The
Kings have not, and cannot, show that they will be harmed or prejudiced in any way whatsoever if Raymond's lA interest in
the water, passed to Mildred Watrous rather than to some other person or entity. The Kings have not, and cannot, show any
significant public interest in the ownership of the water, that would gi\Q them standing to litigate the disposition of
Raymond's lA interest in the water in the interest of the public at large.
Because the Kings cannot "show some distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome
of the dispute, "Sierra Club v. Dept. Of Environmental Quality. Div. Of Solid & Hazardous Waste. 857 P.2d 982 (Utah, 1993),
or great public interest that would give them standing to even assert a claim in this proceeding that Raymond Watrous' lA
interest in the water, or water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, under clear and indisputable
Utah law, the Kings do not have standing to litigate the issue of the disposition of Raymond Watrous' lA ownership of the
water in this action.
Additionally, because Jack King admitted, under oath, that Mr. Henshaw owns all of the water rights, the Kings
admit they sold to the Watrouses, the defendants not only cannot show that they have standing to assert that Raymond
Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death, the defendants are legally estopped to even assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the
Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death.
-7-

Because, the Kings do not have standing, to assert, in this proceeding, that Raymond Watrous5 interest in
the water rights, they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, this court
lacks jurisdiction to hear, and rule upon, the Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water
rights, the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death.
Because this court lacked jurisdiction to hear and rule upon the Kings claim that Raymond Watrous'
interest in the water rights, sold to the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon
Raymond death, that portion of this court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict ruling that Mr.
Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a
matter of law, and must be vacated.
Dated this 25th day of May 2008.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Dee Henshaw
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EXHIBIT 1

To alleviate the purported necessity of a transcript and to avoid the attendant delay,
defendants consent that, for purposes of this motion only, the Court may assume the following: at
oral argument plaintiff argued that defendants lacked standing to move for a directed verdict.
With this assumption in mind, defendants supplement their argument in opposition to
plaintiffs motion to vacate with two additional points.
First, the law of the case prohibits the Courtfromrevisiting the directed verdict. The Trial
Court implicitly rejected plaintiffs "standing" argument by exercising jurisdiction and granting
defendants' motion for directed verdict. If the plaintiff argued "standing" at oral argument on the
motion for directed verdict, then the Trial Court also expressly rejected plaintiffs argument.
"Where . . . any . . . final ruling or order of the trial court goes unchallenged by appeal, such
becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter subject to later challenge." Tracy v. University
of Utah Hospital, 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1980). "In the present action, having failed to perfect
an appealfromthe trial court's [decision]... the applicant is barredfromagain litigating that
issue." Id If plaintiff was dissatisfied with the Trial Court's final decision on the standing issue,
his sole remedy was an appeal and he failed to timely perfect an appeal of the issue.
Second, a Rule 60(b) motion must be "made within a reasonable time." Utah R. Civ. P.
60 (b). It was unreasonable for plaintiff to wait until February 2008 to file his motion to vacate if
he "discovered" the issue of defendants' standing in June 2006 (the date of his motion to alter or
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EXHIBIT 2

fair share?
2 I

A.

Well, you -- you've already established with

3 I Grace Potter that I deeded them over the three hours.
~Q.

You deeded them over the three hours?

5 I

A.

That ? s right.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

correct?

8

A.

I guess they do.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

So they own the three hours; is that

Excellent.

Now, the Watresses used the irrigation from

11

1978 through 1992, when they sold the property to

12

Henshaws; is that correct?

13

A.

Yeah.

14

Q.

Let's look at Exhibit No. 1 and maybe that
Okay.

ITd ask you to

15

will help refresh your memory.

16

look at Exhibit No. 1, if you would, please.

17

the date on that?

Do you se

18

A.

Up here, March of ! 7 8 .

19

Q.

Right.

20

A.

That's what it would be.

21

Q.

It's recorded there, and then your signature

22

is down here lower, and that says 3rd of March 1978, so

23

that's when you sold them the property -- I'm sorry,

24

sold them the water rights?

25

A.

I let him use the water before then.

1

Q.

Okay,

Didn't -- did not the Henshaws claim in

2

their suit against you that you had terminated their use

3

of the water?

4

that you had cut off the water?

Wasn't that the basis of the lawsuit,

.5-

A.

I don't know,

6

Q.

Okay.

7

The second paragraph No. 8 on page 7,

take a look at that, if you would, please.

8

A.

(Witness complies.)

9

Q.

Have you had a chance to look at that?

10

A.

Yes, (Inaudible).

11

Q.

Now, that says the plaintiffs have no right to

12

use water from Pinecreek and their use of such water has

13

harmed the defendant; is that correct?

14

A.

That's what it says.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

But -- yeah.

17

Q.

Good.

18

Was it your assertion at the time that this

19

answer was filed that the plaintiffs had no right to use

20

the water from Pinecreek?

21

A.

I never asserted that.

22

Q.

You've never asserted that?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Are you now admitting, then, that the

13

plaintiffs have the right to use water from Pinecreek
2
3
4
5

for irrigation?
A.

8
9
10
11

they have 3 hours of every 18 days,

but not through my pipeline.
Q.

6
7

They —

But not through your pipeline, okay.
How —

what is your basis that they do not

have the right to get the water through your pipeline?
A.

They've never done anything on it and they've

never paid me for the right to use my pipeline.
Q.

Okay.

Now, did not the Watresses pay you for

the right to use your pipeline?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Did you not allow the Watresses to use your

14

pipeline and connect their pipeline to your pipeline for

15

a period of approximately 24 years?

16

A.

That Ts right.

17

Q.

All right.

18
19
20
21
22

Did Alan Bradberry ever tell you that you had
the right to disconnect the Henshaws' water?
A.

Yeah.

I wouldn't know.

I forget what Alan

would say to me.
Q.

Okay.

Isn't it a fact, Mr. King, that you

23

told John Hunt, when he was up to your property, that

24

Alan Bradberry told you that you had the right to cut

25

off the Henshaws' water?

1

A.

That was the reason for putting it in.

2

Q.

So that they couldn't -- so that they couldn't

3

irrigate?

4

A.

So that they couldn't steal my water.

5

Q.

Well, if they were using -- if you say --

6

you've already admitted that they were entitled to use

7

the three hours of water.

8

on there so they could not use it, then how are they

9

stealing your water?

If you potentially put this

Aren't you depriving them of their

10

right to use the water that you just admitted that they

11

had?

12

A.

I believe you're turning things around.

13

Q.

Let me rephrase it, then.

14
15
16
17
18

You've admitted that the Henshaws have the
right to use some water; correct?
A.

I admit that they had the right to use 3 hours

out of every 18 days.
Q.

Okay, fine.

They had the right to use 3 hours

19

in 18 days.

And you knew that they were running that

20

water through a three-inch pipeline and that it was

21

coming off of one-inch risers into their handrails, into

22

their hand lines, you knew that, didn't you?

23

A.

Well, I guess.

24

Q.

And you deliberately pun a half-inch gate

25

valve on that three-inch pipe to reduce the water,

1

plaintiffs have the right to use water from Pinecreek

2

for irrigation?

3
4
5

A,

but not through my pipeline.
Q.

6
7
8
9
10
11

They -- they have 3 hours of every 18 days,

But not through your pipeline, okay.
How —

what is your basis that they do not

have the right to get the water through your pipeline?
A.

They've never done anything on it and they've

never paid me for the right to use my pipeline.
Q.

Okay.

Now, did not the Watresses pay you for

the right to use your pipeline?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Did you not allow the Watresses to use your

14

pipeline and connect their pipeline to your pipeline for

15

a period of approximately 24 years?

16

A.

That f s right.

17

Q.

All right.

18
19
20
21
22

Did Alan Bradberry ever tell you that you had
the right to disconnect the Henshaws' water?
A.

Yeah.

I wouldn't know.

I forget what Alan

would say to me.
Q.

Okay.

Isn't it a fact, Mr. King, that you

23

told John Hunt, when he was up to your property, that

24

Alan Bradberry told you that you had the right to cut

25

off the Henshaws' water?

2 1
3

A.

That was the reason for putting it in.

Q.

So that they couldn T t -- so that they couldn't

irrigate?

4

A.

So that they couldn't steal my water.

5

Q.

Well f if they were using -- if you say

—

6

you've already admitted that they were entitled to use

7

the three hours of water.

8

on there so they could not use it, then how are they

9

stealing your water?

If you potentially put this

Aren't you depriving them of their

10

right to use the water that you just admitted that they

11

had?

12

A.

I believe you're turning things around.

13

Q.

Let me rephrase it, then.

14
15
16
17
18

You've admitted that the Henshaws have the
right to use some water; correct?
A.

I admit that they had the right to use 3 hours

out of every 18 days.
Q.

Okay, fine.

They had the right to use 3 hours

19

in 18 days.

And you knew that they were running that

20

water through a three-inch pipeline and that it was

21

coming off of one-inch risers into their handrails, into

22

their hand lines, you knew that, didn't you?

23

A.

Well, I guess.

24

Q.

And you deliberately put a half-inch gate

25

valve on that three-inch pipe to reduce the water,

1

have gone back and forth on this, because I guess maybe

2 I we're just on different pages and didn't quite
3 | understand.

Are you claiming that you own all of the

4 ] water in Pinecreek?
A.

I never did own that.

6 I

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

I (Inaudible).

8

Q.

That's where the confusion was, because I

9

asked you, "Admit that you do not own the full flow of

10

the water from Pinecreek," and you denied that.

You're

11

not claiming that you own it, then, all of the water in

12

Pinecreek?

13

A.

That's right.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

I think it's 14 days out of 18, or maybe more.

16
17
18

How much do you claim you own?

I don't know exactly.
Q.

We've got it down there.

How was the -- how was the water ownership on

Pinecreek computed, do you know?

19

A.

Everybody had so many days water and hours.

20

Q.

How many people are you aware of that have

21

water rights on Pinecreek?

22

A.

Just me and the State Fish and Game.

23

Q.

You're not aware of anyone else?

24

A.

Well, just Dee, got that 3 hours.

25

Q.

All right.

Okay.

1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

My son is (Inaudible) water meters employee.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

You heard Grace Potter testify earlier

today, didn't you?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And she testified that she never would have

7 I notarized Exhibit No. 1 if you didn't sign it in front
8 I of her; isn't that correct?

10 I
11

A.

That is correct.

Q.

Is it your testimony that Grace Potter was

lying when she made that statement?

12

A.

I wouldn't call Grace a liar, but it's been a

13

long time.

I don't really know for sure which way it

14

was, but my signature's here and my wife's signature's

15

there.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

And we admitted that that's our signature.

18

Why are we dwelling on it?

19

Q.

Are you now admitting that Exhibit No. 1 is in

20

fact a water deed for the sale of 3 hours of Pmecreek

21

water to Watresses?

22

A.

Well, yeah, they got 3 hours.

23

Q.

Okay.

I just want to make it crystal clear

24

here because this has been the problem from day one of

25

this.

58

1
2

A.

It shouldn't have been because I've already

admitted that a long time ago.

3

Q.

Okay.

Then you're admitting here today, for

4

the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3

5

hours full flow of Pinecreek water?

6

A.

Every 18 days.

7

Q.

Every 18 days; is that correct?

8

A.

That's right.

9

Q.

Okay.

Great.

10

MR. SCHULTZ:

No further questions.

11

MR. WILLIAMS:

I have a follow-up question.

12

I!m going to mark this as Exhibit 10.

13

where we are.

14

(Exhibit No. 10 marked.)

15

EXAMINATION

16

BY MR.

17
18

WILLIAMS:
Q.

you t o

I don't

take

a

A.

Okay.

20

Q.

Jack

21

at

a copy

of

it

so

I'm

going

to

ask

it.

—

MR.

WILLIAMS:

I'm

David W i l l i a m s ,

22

purposes,

23

Bonnie

King.

24

BY MR.

WILLIAMS :
Q.

have

look

19

25

I believe that's

Jack,

I'm

And j u s t

showing

I

for

identification

represent

you w h a t ' s

Jack

been

and

marked

as
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
Wayne County Courthouse, Loa, Utah 84747
Telephone: (435) 836-1301; Facsimile: (435) 836-2479

BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF JACK KING and
BONNIE KING,

Case No. 000600007
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee

Defendants.

The following motions are pending in this case: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate filed on
6 February 2008; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum filed on 5
March 2008; (3) Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions filed on 20 March 2008; and (4)
Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum filed on 27 May 2008.
All these motions, except for the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, have been fully briefed
and are now ready for a decision.
DECISION
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate should be denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File
Reply Memorandum should be granted. Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions should not

HENSHAW v. KING, Case No. 000600007
Memorandum Decision and Order
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be considered at this time. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum should be
granted.
ANALYSIS
A.

Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum and Motion to File Overlength

Memorandum:
The plaintiffs requested additional time to file a Reply Memorandum in support of their
Motion to Vacate. The plaintiffs sought additional time in order to obtain a transcript of the trial.
However, the plaintiffs filed their Reply Memorandum on 27 May 2008, which was
approximately three months late. The plaintiffs did not obtain the transcript and did not file it in
support of their Reply.
Nevertheless, the Court is willing to consider the plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in
conjunction with its ruling on the plaintiffs Motion to Vacate. To this extent, the plaintiffs'
Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum should be granted.
Similarly, the Court finds the plaintiffs adequately explained their need to file an
overlength memorandum in reply to the defendant's opposition to the plaintiffs Motion to
Vacate. Therefore, the plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum should also be
granted.
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B.

Motion to Vacate:
The plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate is based on Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure. The Motion seeks a ruling voiding a portion of the directed verdict entered on 15
May 2006 against the plaintiffs. The basis advanced in support of this motion is that the
defendants did not have standing to argue that the water right in this case did not pass from
Raymond Waltrous to his wife.
A motion under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within a reasonable time. In this case, the
plaintiffs' current Motion was filed approximately 21 months after entry of the directed verdict,
after decision on other post-trial motions, and following an appeal. The Court concludes the
Motion is simply not timely because it was not filed within a reasonable time.
There can be no legitimate claim that standing is a new issue. Both parties agree the
plaintiffs argued the issue of standing at the time of trial. The plaintiffs also raised standing in
their Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed on 23 June 2006. The issue was again raised in
the plaintiffs' appellate brief filed sometime in December of 2006. However, the plaintiffs
waited until 6 February 2008 to bring this Motion to Vacate based on lack of standing.
The Court finds the plaintiffs' delay in raising this issue unreasonable. Thus, the
plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate should be denied as untimely.
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C.

Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions:
The defendants filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on 20 March 2008. The Certificate

of Mailing shows this Motion and the supporting memorandum were mailed to the plaintiffs'
attorney. The plaintiffs did not respond to this Motion, and the defendants filed a Request to
Submit for decision on 23 May 2008.
On 27 May 2008, the plaintiffs filed an Objection to Defendants' Request to Submit. In
the Objection, the plaintiffs stated they had never received the defendants' Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions. To date, the plaintiffs have still not filed a response to Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions.
The Court is willing to give the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt that they did not receive
the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. Thus, it is premature to rule on this Motion.
The Motion and supporting memorandum are attached to this decision for the plaintiffs'
reference. The parties are directed to follow the briefing schedule in Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Either party may file a new request to submit for decision when the Motion is fully
briefed.

j?

HENSHAW v. K I N G , Case No. 000600007
Memorandum Decision and Order
Page 5

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate is denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply
Memorandum is granted. Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is not considered
time. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum is granted.
DATED this

18 July

., 2008.

Wallace A Lee
WALLACE A. LEE, Judge
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